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Abstract 
Rapid urbanization in China has led to the increasing scarcity of land suitable and 
available for construction. Concurrently, rural depopulation has resulted in many 
vacant properties, including farmhouses and buildings. In order to address this issue, 
a national land transfer policy has been implemented since the early 2000s in which 
vacant rural properties are returned to agriculture in return for similar areas of peri-
urban land being released for construction. While there have been many different 
approaches to policy implementation, most commentators agree that successful 
schemes are characterized by the involvement of local people. As yet, however, there 
has been little research into how such local collective action is organized, and whether 
it is really possible to address top-down policies through local, bottom-up, action. 
Based on a case study of the earliest pilot program in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, we 
seek to demonstrate that the top-down nature of China’s land transfer policy does not 
mean that it is necessarily best implemented in a top-down manner. Indeed, we 
suggest that effective collective action is crucial to the realization of such policies. In 
particular, the case study indicates that with the empowerment of villagers to 
participate in the policy process it is possible to achieve a broad consensus on the best 
approach to addressing the problems, with community interests protected and properly 
monitoring. In offering a new way of understanding collective action, we conclude that 
even in cases where a top-down approach is imposed, communities can be 
empowered to act collectively in implementing the policy from the bottom-up. 
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Introduction 
 
There has been rampant urbanization in China since the economic reforms of 1978, 
with high economic growth, rural-urban migration and increasing demand for 
construction land in and around cities (see Skinner, et al, 2001; Lin and Ho, 2003; 
Long et al., 2007, 2011; Fang, et al, 2016; Liu, P., et al, 2016; Qin and Liao, 2016). 
This has led to considerable controversy and conflict in the allocation of land, 
particularly relating to decisions to convert agricultural land into construction land on 
the urban fringe (Tang, et al, 2012; Liang, et al, 2015; Jin, et al, 2016; Yep and 
Forrest, 2016). Not only has this changed the character of peri-urban land, but it has 
threatened local food supplies (Yang and Li, 2000; Chen, 2009; Zhou, 2010; Jiang, et 
al, 2015; Fang, et al, 2016) and has changed the culture of rural life (Friedman, 2006; 
Xu, et al, 2011; Siciliano, 2012; Li, et al, 2014). Indeed, as Brown and Shucksmith 
(2016: p.183) have commented, ‘change, not stability, is the normal situation facing 
rural communities today.’ While this is not an entirely new phenomenon, in China or 
elsewhere, the issues have intensified in recent years as the pace of urban 
expansion has increased (Xu, et al, 2011; Li, 2013; Li, et al, 2016), meaning that 
China is facing unprecedented questions about how it balances the many competing 
claims for land on the urban fringe (Long, et al, 2012).  
 
In seeking to address this issue, the Chinese central government evolved its Redline 
Paradigm in the late 1990s, which involved creating an ‘insurmountable boundary’ 
around farm land to prevent the further net loss agricultural land to non-agricultural 
development (Lu, et al, 2012; He, et al., 2014; Bai, et al, 2016). This has since been 
modified to reflect an ecosystem services approach to land conservation (Bai, et al, 
2016) which has sought to protect the overall area of crop and other lands while also 
demarcating restricted and prohibited development zones. At the core of this is the 
policy of ‘Coordinating Urban and Rural Construction Land’ (CURCL), which has 
attracted much attention in the literature (Xu, et al, 2011; Long, et al, 2012; Tang, et 
al, 2012; Huang, et al, 2013). It was introduced by the Ministry of Land and 
Resources of China in 2005, with the key objective of achieving equilibrium in the 
supply of construction land by balancing increases in urban construction land with 
decreases in rural construction land (Long, et al, 2012). The policy, known 
colloquially as the ‘‘increasing vs. decreasing balance’ land-use policy’ (Long, et al, 
2012: p.20) is based on the relocation of farmers’ housing from the countryside to 
rural residential districts, while allowing the farmers to continue farming. The land 
upon which the former farmhouses and abandoned farmsteads stood – of which 
there is a lot (Qin and Liao, 2016) - is then reclaimed as farmland, with an area of 
farmland (equivalent to the reclamation area minus the farmland area occupied by 
the new residential district) adjacent to the city made available for conversion into 
urban construction land. As such, the CURCL policy is an instrument used by 
governments to provide construction land for economic growth while protecting 
arable land (Tang, et al, 2012). 
 
Rather than being a relatively simple approach to the forced purchase of building 
land on the urban fringe, therefore, the CURCL policy is what Long, et al (2012: p.17) 
term a “spatial transfer of land development rights” in which local governments and 
development companies can generate large revenues from the difference between 
the value of these rights and the compensation paid to farmers. Given that farmer 
participation in the pilot scheme has been voluntary, the government has emphasized 
that if no agreement is reached, no programs would be initiated. Yet farmers have 
participated in many schemes (Liu, et al, 2016), suggesting that such schemes are 
likely to have been developed in the most advantageous financial locations, for the 
more powerful stakeholders, rather than necessarily where there is a lot of 
abandoned property or good land to be reclaimed.  
 
The CURCL policy has received considerable scrutiny, in terms of its potential 
implications (Lu, et al, 2012) and in terms of its implementation, at this stage through 
pilot programs (Xu, et al, 2011; Long, et al, 2012; Tang, et al, 2012; Huang, et al, 
2013). Research has found that it has been effective in reducing conflict between 
conservation and development (Tang, et al, 2012) and that it has contributed to the 
improvement of farmers’ housing conditions (see Dou, et al, 2008; Long, et al, 2011; 
Huang, et al, 2013; Yep and Forrest, 2016). However, it is also clear that not all those 
involved have been equally enthusiastic, with the strongest motivation for 
implementing the policy coming from local government and external investors, rather 
than farmers (Long, et al, 2012; Tang, et al, 2012). Indeed, perhaps the greatest 
indictment of the policy has been the general lack of official recognition that there has 
been for the negative impact that it has had on the culture and economy of many 
farming households (Xu, et al, 2011; Siciliano, 2012; Tang, et al, 2012; Huang, et al, 
2013; Yep and Forrest, 2016), and its wider contribution to declining local food 
security (Chen, 2009; Zhou, 2010; Jiang, et al, 2015).   
 
In their work, Long, et al (2012) have argued that this lack of consideration for 
farmers and their neighbors has arisen because of: 
 
 … a failure to adequately engage and enroll local actors into the 
planning and decision-making process. Although some programs … have 
involved grassroots participation, more generally the input of local people 
is perceived to be limited. (Long, et al, 2012: p.20) 
 
While similar conclusions have been drawn in other research (Tang, et al, 2012), and 
calls have been made for public participation to be brought into the operation of the 
policy (Lu, et al, 2012), there is little evidence to date about how this might happen. 
Our intention in this paper is to build on recent research into local collective action 
(Li, et al, 2016; Liu, Z. et al, 2016) in order to address this gap in the literature. Our 
core argument is that it is not necessarily the case that top-down policies of this 
nature must be implemented in a top-down manner. On the contrary, we suggest that 
bottom-up policy implementation informed by effective collective action are crucial to 
the equitable and successful realization of top-down schemes of this type. The aim of 
this paper is thus to examine the extent to which a top-down policy such as CURCL 
can be implemented from the bottom-up. In particular, we want to examine why those 
likely to be adversely affected are willing to become part of the policy process, what 
the impacts of the CURCL policy have been on them, and how these impacts have 
been managed by the ability of the farmers to participate in forms of collective action. 
 
Using a case study of Lianghe Village in the south west of Chengdu City, we seek to 
demonstrate that with the empowerment of villagers to participate in the policy 
process it is possible to achieve a broad consensus on the best approach to 
addressing the problems, with community interests suitably monitored and protected. 
We conclude that even in cases where a top-down approach appears necessary, 
consideration should be given to implementing the policy from the bottom up by 
supporting communities to be able to take strong and collective action. The paper 
commences with a review of the literature on collective action, which argues that 
narrow western understandings are inappropriate to the situation in China, where a 
lack of purposive collective organization is balanced by the potential power of the 
convergent behaviors of many individuals. The case of Lianghe Village is then used 
to identify where collective action has occurred, how it has been fostered and what 
impact this has had on the implementation of CURCL. The final section of the paper 
discusses the findings and argues that the lack of local collective organization 
characteristic of the State monopoly of the public realm in China does not prevent 
individuals from asserting their needs in common with others.  
 
The Potential for Collective Action 
 
There is a rich literature on collective action, related in general to the ways in which 
people act together (Gilbert, 1989, 2006; Oliver, 1993), and with respect to the 
institutions through which certain common pool resources are managed (Ostrom, 
1990). Notwithstanding Olson’s (1965) differentiation between self-interest and the 
public good, collective action is conventionally understood as arising from a shared 
interest between a group of people (Oliver, 1993), implying the existence of social 
networks, freedom of action and some element of spatial connection (Bosco, 2001). 
This is not the collective as it is understood historically in China (Nolan, 1988), but a 
voluntary form of association based on the social identity and spatial proximity of 
those involved (see Liu and Ravenscroft 2016).  
 
For van Zomeren, et al (2012), collective action arises from three conditions: 
injustice, efficacy and identity. In their research they found that there was a causal 
link between feelings of unjust deprivation and the development of collective action. 
This was reinforced where there were clear social identities to protect and also where 
it was felt that collective action was a justified means of achieving particular collective 
goals. As Ostrom’s (1990) work has illustrated, it is this third condition – the efficacy 
of collective action – that has often been difficult to achieve, due to a lack of suitable 
institutional arrangements through which deprived and marginalized people can 
make their collective case. This seems to be the case with the CURCL policy, where 
there is little doubt that rural people - farmers in particular - are being asked to make 
fundamental changes in their lives with apparently little way of participating in the 
decision-making process. Indeed, as Tang, et al (2012: p389) have argued, the 
implementation of current policy means that the rights of many farmers are ‘… 
seriously violated.’  
 
Yet there is little evidence of the organized and purposive collective action typically 
found in such situations (Wanyama, et al, 2014). This is largely because such action 
is not so possible in China, where significant State control of the public sphere tends 
to mean that collective action occurs as a result of many individual behaviors 
converging in the same direction and assuming a form of collective character (Zhou, 
1993: p54). This is not to say that there is a lack of potential for collective action, but 
that it needs to be understood in the context of rural China, where most people are 
tied to both the place and their social position within it. Lacking the efficacy to 
organize collective action against those with higher status, the collective amounts to 
what Zhou (1993: p56) terms a ‘subordinate society’ in which people have to act 
individually, but in a context in which their legitimate range of actions is so 
circumscribed that their behaviors converge (we note that Panelli, 2004, claims that 
this is not limited to China, but is the case in most situations). Not only can this 
amount to a (disorganized) form of social mobilization (termed ‘rightful resistance’ by 
O’Brien and Li, 2006), but it can actually be a powerful one because it does not 
depend on acquiescence and obedience to a common institutional form (Simpson 
and Macy, 2004). 
 In addressing the potential for collective action in responding to the CURCL policy, 
therefore, we understand that we have to move beyond narrow western ideas of 
organized and effective collective action to examine how individual, subordinate, 
people respond in ways that offer them some collective bargaining power. This is not, 
therefore, research about collective action in the conventional and purposive sense, 
but rather an investigation into whether individually shared interests and behaviors 
can influence a bottom-up approach to implementing top-down policy. Our research 
question is: To what extent is the successful implementation of CURCL schemes 
dependent on legitimizing collective action? 
 
Methods and procedures 
 
The research question seeks insights from those involved, as individuals and group 
members, largely in the form of memories of events that have taken place in the last 
few years. It is therefore suited to a constructivist approach to data generation 
focused on how these participants understood and felt about the implementation of 
the CURCL policy. This means that the individual is of primary concern, but within a 
spatial and temporal context that involves interaction with other people (Lauckner, et 
al, 2012). This interactional focus meant also that data need to be generated from a 
real-world community (Yin, 2009) that had experienced the negotiations surrounding 
and the impacts of the policy.  
 
A single case study method was chosen as the means of data generation. We 
selected Lianghe Village, located at the southern west of Chengdu City, because 
initial research indicated that the villagers had worked together through a form of 
collective action to try and secure an equitable settlement from the implementation of 
the CURCL policy. Lianghe Village has a population of 2115 in 618 households and 
12 villager groups. The total farmland was 4676.05 mu. About 1/3 of the population, 
mainly young people, work outside the county. Chengdu City was, in 2007, one of the 
pilot areas designated for exploring the optimization of rural construction land, 
meaning that it has been subject to considerable academic scrutiny (see Wu, 2011; 
Long, et al, 2012; Huang, et al, 2013). 
 
A group of four researchers undertook the local investigation for 15 days during July 
and August 2013, covering 10 villages (including Lianghe Village) in 4 counties 
(Pujiang, Jinjiang, Wenjiang, Shuangliu). In each village the interviewees included 
local government officials, village leaders and farmers. In the case of Lianghe Village, 
interviews took place with 3 government officials, and 3 group interviews were held 
separately: one with 2 village leaders and 3 villagers, one with 3 villagers who 
participated in the CURCL Program, and one with 3 villagers who did not participate.  
 
Structured in-depth interviews were carried out using a series of open-ended 
questions to which the interviewees could give narrative responses. For the county 
and town government officials, questions were asked about the general 
implementation of the policy, the main operating processes, the problems or failures 
most frequently encountered and local solutions. The main questions for the group 
interviews were about their motivation to participate in the program, how the 
decisions of individuals (whether to participate or not, for example) and of the village 
leaders (such as the setting of standards for participants) were made, and how the 
policy was implemented. These interviewees were also asked about the main 
problems that they encountered and how these problems were solved. The interview 
records were taken down in shorthand, and written up that evening. The researchers 
held regular reviews to compare their findings and to make sure that nothing 
significant was missed out.  
 
In addition, the leaders of Lianghe Village managed to take excellent records of all 
kinds of village meetings. All the records taken during the period 2011 to 2013 were 
made available to the researchers, which served as the main secondary data source 
for researching the process of policy implementation. The records were analyzed 
according to the same themes as the interviews, with significant entries copied by 
photo and translated into the fieldwork transcript. 
 
Findings: the role of collective action in Lianghe Village  
 
The program in Lianghe Village was initiated in 2010 and completed in 2013. In 
common with some of the other programs, it was at first run by a private investment 
company but encountered serious cash flow problems. As a result, the village 
committee decided to take over the program and implement it themselves. There was 
a collective sense of injustice that the company scheme had not worked, leaving 
them in a vulnerable position, although by the same token this gave them the efficacy 
to act collectively. The village committee worked hard to find suitable finance and 
was eventually able to make an arrangement with the Bureau of Land and Resource 
of Chengdu City, through a mortgage on future CURCL credits (at the benchmark 
price of 230,000 yuan per mu, or approx. 15,000 yuan per hectare). The program 
built a total area of 39,000 m2 of housing, for 293 households (1150 individuals). The 
reclaimed farmland amounted to 398.4 mu (26 hectares) and the land for building the 
new centralized housing was about 103 mu (6.5 hectares). Thus the final CUCRL 
credits amounted to 295.5 mu (approx. 20 hectares). About 95% of the credits were 
purchased via the Rural Property Rights Exchange of Chengdu, with the remaining 
5% saved by the village for future development. 
 
Like most township governments, the Lianghe village authorities had originally 
expected to play a relatively minor role in implementing the policy, mainly through 
advocating the program to villagers and farmers, helping the village organize and 
apply for the credits, and monitoring progress. In many ways it would have helped 
shape the behavior of individual villagers in ways that converged with a collective 
approach to the policy. In taking on the implementation themselves, however, the 
village authorities had to move away from this facilitating approach to address all the 
difficult issues, including determining competing claims over land. This led to the 
development of a new approach to collective action, achieved by revitalizing an old 
system, known as Yi-Shi-Hui (YSH), which had been developed in the 1980s. This 
involved the villagers selecting a committee of reputable elders and capable people 
who were tasked with working collectively to resolve conflicts. The committee was 
convened by the Village Secretary of the Party, who acted in a non-voting capacity. 
The YSH provided a strong base for collective action during the implement of the 
CURCL policy, a situation acknowledged by all the villagers who were interviewed.   
 
The most obvious advantage of the YSH approach was in resolving the internal 
village disputes about land rights. Given the lack of written documents, many 
interviewees responded with the old Chinese saying that ‘Each side is reasonable’ 
(‘Gong Shuo Gong You Li, Po Shuo Po You Li’), implying the need for a neutral forum 
in which claims could be aired. While it could not reduce the burden of hearing claims 
and counter-claims, the YSH was familiar with the local situation, the history and the 
current state of the land. Sometimes it took many meetings and long evenings to find 
resolutions, with agreements eventually confirmed by the fingerprints of both sides. It 
was widely agreed that this process was much more respected than was the case 
with governmental solutions elsewhere, because it had been negotiated by the 
villagers themselves. There is no suggestion in the meeting notes of the farmers or 
other interest groups organizing themselves or acting collectively. Rather, as Zhou 
(1993) has previously noted, the affected individuals adopted behaviors that allowed 
the YSH to hold collective village meetings that were suitable for establishing 
solutions that met individual aspirations. The group of seven villagers chosen by the 
YSH to be responsible for running the program included senior Party members, 
reputable elders of the village, previous leaders of the Village, and a villager who did 
not participate in the program. All decisions about the program, such as the survey of 
the total construction land area, new house planning, dismantling the old houses and 
building and allocating the new houses, were made by the special group and 
implemented by the Village Committee and all villagers. All the expenses of the 
program were also controlled by the Group members. From 2011 to 2013, about 37 
official group meetings were held, with meeting records, and fingerprints of 
participants.  
 
It was apparent that the Group knew well the risks and problems that they would 
encounter, and that they had the backing of the villagers and were creative enough to 
overcome them. This was particularly the case when the company withdrew; not only 
did the Group secure new funds, but the funder agreed to pay in advance for their 
CURCL credits, at a low price. However, the investment was smaller than that 
originally agreed with the private company, which meant that villagers had to bear 
more of the costs, in the process increasing their sense of injustice. Despite the wish 
to work collectively, some villagers were not satisfied with the outcome, meaning that 
the Group had to find consensus in order to proceed with the program. Meeting 
Records from 2011.12.10 give a flavor of what happened: 
 
Song (female farmer): Why do we have to pay 3,000 yuan per capita and 
then 1200 per square meter?  
Yao (committee member): The 1200 yuan per square meter was for the 
additional space available for each family besides the share of 35 square 
meters per capita, and the 3000 yuan per capita was for participating the 
program [as we didn’t have enough investment.] 
Wang (male farmer): How about the potential benefits of lands taken for 
the new housing site and those reclaimed for farming, when they are 
expropriated by the government in the future? 
Yao: The benefits for lands and houses expropriated by the government 
in the future will be redistributed at the village level. 
Lv (male): Where can we store our tools when waiting for the new 
housing? 
Yao: You have to deal with it yourselves. 
 
In other villages where private companies were successful, participants did not pay 
extra money per capita. However, even though some of the Lianghe villagers were 
not happy with it, they still participated in the program, and supported the collective 
decisions.  
 
A major risk which troubled the local bureau of land and resources with respect to the 
implementation of CURCL generally was that individual farmers did not respect the 
contracts. For example, there were cases in some villages where farmers got a new 
house but did not dismantle the old one, as their contract required. However, it was 
very difficult for the government to monitor the situation, with the local officials relying 
on the deposits paid as a means of ensuring compliance. In Lianghe Village the YSH 
agreed to set strict rules to avoid the risk: 
 
… All participants should dismantle the old house soon after signing the 
contracts. All the housing lands should be reclaimed as farmland for food 
crops, and no tree planting is allowed. (Meeting records of 2011.12.14) 
 
One of the villagers refused to demolish his old house. After the new houses were 
built he tried belatedly to join the program by asking his relative – an officer in the 
Provincial government - to call the Village Committee Leader, Yao. The village 
committee rejected his approach:  
 
If you didn’t dismantle the old house, then you can’t get the new one … 
All the villagers are watching us. If we start to give in, then there is 
nothing we can do in the future. (Yao, female) 
 
Despite protests from the farmer, the remaining villagers strongly supported the 
decision, as the group and the village committee were protecting their common 
interests, even where it meant that they would be inconvenienced or would otherwise 
lose out. Here there was a clear collective approach to the issue, involving many 
villagers and the YSH, although there is no evidence that there was any specific 
organization of the collective. Rather, the strong social identity of the villagers, allied 
to their widely perceived injustice, enabled them to support strong decisions. In this 
case they had the efficacy necessary to act collectively without the need for 
organization. In Zhou’s (1993) terms, the convergent behavior of ‘large numbers’ of 
individuals provided a collective standpoint from which action could be taken in their 
(collective) name.  
 
Membership of the village – and thus access to the benefits of the CURCL scheme - 
was in many cases a difficult question that inspired much conflict. This was largely 
because of the Hukou (household registration) system (Cheng and Selden, 1994; 
Chan and Zhang, 1999; Song 2014, Andreas and Zhan 2016). Unlike many 
population registration systems, the Hukou system was designed to regulate 
population distribution as well as providing a range of population data. Indeed, Chan 
and Zhang (1999) have described the system as one of the major tools of social 
control employed by the state. This meant that some people who had left the village 
years before could still claim residence while others - outsiders who had married 
local farmers, for example – often could not, unless their Hukou had transferred with 
them. Not only did this system regulate the social status of the villagers (Cheng and 
Selden, 1994), but it also meant that decisions made about the allocation of land and 
housing had substantial financial impacts. In Lianghe Village, the total amount of 
benefit was fixed, with the decision about how to divide it among the village members 
negotiated by the YSH. Following extensive consultation the YSH produced a set of 
rules for the allocation of the benefit, which was approved by the village committee. 
This meant that the village had its own rules, generated through a form of collective 
action. The rules included provision for future population increases, protection for 
incomers who lived in the village but did not have the correct Hukou, and recognition 
of continuing residence for those who were away in higher education and military 
service. 
 
One area of potential conflict that related centrally to the ownership of Hukou was the 
allocation of the new houses. In Lianghe Village the YSH approached this by making 
the process as fair and transparent as possible: 
 
Those whose houses or lands are taken by the new housing site have the 
priority to choose a new house. (Meeting records of 2011.4.16 
/2011.4.28) (Village group 11)/ (Village group 10) 
 
All participants should take 2 trees before moving into the new house (for 
the community greening). Those with houses or lands taken by the new 
housing site choose the new houses first. Others choose the new house 
strictly by lottery. (Meeting records of 2011.12.10) 
 
In order to ensure the fairness (of house allocation), an YSH member 
should be chosen every day to finalize the process. All the participants 
should be checked whether they fulfilled the requirement or not. The 
lottery used on April 30 should be designed and packed together by 
village representatives. The results of the lottery should be announced 
immediately. (Meeting records of 2013.4.20.) 
 
As the records suggest, the allocation of the new houses was mainly done by lottery, 
with the process video-recorded and journalists invited to make sure that the process 
was transparent and fair. By doing this, Lianghe Village gained strong support from 
the villagers, including those who did not participate in the program.  
 
The Group also kept the costs down, which was especially important given the 
limited investment. According to Yao, the overall construction cost of the new housing 
was only half of the one run by the local government. A bidding system for the 
materials and engineering services was already well established because the Group 
members were familiar with local merchants, and they spent lots of time doing market 
investigation voluntarily.  
 
Another advantage of the approach deployed in Lianghe Village was the level and 
precision of internal and external monitoring. As the Group in charge of the program, 
all decisions were recorded with fingerprints, and meetings were documented as well 
as being open to the villagers. The Group also shared the responsibility to ensure 
that the quality of the housing was good, by monitoring the construction site both day 
and night. It was also in the farmers’ interests to do the monitoring effectively 
because their old houses had been demolished before they could move into their 
new homes meaning that they were in temporary accommodation. They therefore 
had a strong incentive to make sure that the construction was undertaken properly 
and to time. 
 
The most obvious advantage of this form of collective action at the local level was 
that the Group managed to implement the program, even with the limited funding 
available and some villagers unhappy at the settlement that had been achieved. The 
Group’s internal problem solving mechanism was the key to effective bottom-up 
decision making. One of the controversies was about the compensation for lands 
taken up by the new housing site. Due to the shortage of money for the program, the 
compensation rate for lands taken was lower than in other villages, at about 36,000 
yuan per mu (2,400 yuan per hectare). Villagers found out that it was nearly double 
this in nearby towns, where the program was run by companies. However, the village 
committee could not fulfill their demands for additional compensation. Thus meetings 
were held frequently to negotiate a solution:   
 
From meeting records of 2011.04.15 and 16 
(on the site occupied by the new housing, negotiation meetings with the 
village group 11 ) 
Li (1): (As a member of group 11) I agree with the decision about the new 
housing site on village group 11. We need to clarify to members that we 
should appreciate the precious opportunity we now have. It’s a good thing 
and beneficial to all of us. For my kiwi fruit lands that have been taken, 
some compensation for the cost is enough for me. 
 
Huang (1): the compensation for land was 15 thousand yuan per mu 
when the pork price was 2-3 yuan per jin (500g). Now the pork price has 
increased a lot to 11-12 yuan per jin (500g), while the compensation is 
only 30 thousand yuan per mu. It is really unsound…if the lands are 
taken, I don’t have any lands left. 
 
Li (2): The compensation is really low indeed. 
 
Huang (2): Someone might find the compensation too low no matter what 
standard it is. …It’s quite possible that the program can’t afford it finally. 
 
Yao: If you want to continue farming, it is possible to exchange lands for 
you. […] We had better think about the common interest of the village. 
The investment for the new housing site is about 100 million yuan. How 
long does it take the whole village to earn so much money? 
 
After days of negotiation, they managed to reach agreement: the compensation 
standard remained unchanged, while there were more benefits for those whose land 
was taken. For example, they were offered living cost subsidies at 140 yuan per 
month per capita and they had the priority on choosing the new housing. If there 
were lands taken up by the government in the future, the benefit would be 
redistributed at the Village level. Most of those with strong opposing opinions were 
persuaded and had their finger printed (meeting records of 2011.04.16). It was 
commonly understood that this level of success was due to the work of the village 
committee. 
 
However, there were two households who didn’t accept the deal. One insisted on 
compensation of at least 60,000 yuan per mu, because there were kiwifruit trees on 
the land with 30,000 yuan per mu output annually; the other was trying to blackmail 
the village, asking for compensation of 3 new houses for 1 old house (used for pig 
raising) taken. This owner lived in Chengdu City and refused to budge after all kinds 
of negotiations. 
 
I was with the YSH that all villagers should be treated equal, or the 
consensus with other villagers we had achieved before would be 
dismantled, and it was impossible to continue working afterwards. Thus 
we all finally agreed to give them up. Now you can see the kiwi fruit fields 
in the new community, also the shabby pig raising house there. (Yao, 
female) 
 
With the support of the Village Committee, the Group set up rules without exception, 
through which the Village Committee gained support from the local town government. 
This process enhanced the trust of villagers toward the Group and the village cadres. 
With strong involvement of the villagers during the whole process, and the work done 
by the Group, the program went smoothly with high levels of satisfaction, even 
though the compensation standard was lower than expected and the private cost was 
higher than other villages. For example:  
 
At first it was said that the price of the credits was 300,000 yuan per mu, 
and villagers didn’t need to pay for the new house, even the decoration. 
Later the price dropped down to 180,000 per mu, not enough to support 
the new house building. …finally villagers had to pay 3,000 yuan per 
capita for the new house. (Wang, male) 
 
Nevertheless, Wang claimed that about 90% villagers supported the program 
because they would get a new house for not much money. Wang didn’t participate in 
the program (because his house was not large enough on the per capita base and it 
was just redecorated after an earthquake of 2008), but he had about 1 mu land taken 
for the new housing site with low compensation standard. According to his 
observation, Wang agreed that the program was a rare opportunity for the farmers 
and village and the collective was doing a good job, so he agreed with the village 
when it came to the negotiations. Other non-participants had similar reasons to 
Wang, while some people were unwilling to dismantle their old house that had been 
passed down by generations. Some farmers were also influenced by their 
expectation of future incomes: 
 
Some [farmers] are doing pig farming at home, which is not allowed in the 
new community. They would lose the income if they participate. I gave up 
pig farming in order to participate in the program. I used to raise 200 pigs, 
and the annual loss is about 50,000-60,000 yuan. …Others didn’t 
participate because the new housing site is too far from their farmland. 
(Ni, female) 
 
There were some complaints from the villagers about the new community life. The 
most significant one concerned the prohibition against keeping animals, given that 
animal breeding used to be a cornerstone of the farming community. The villagers 
also emphasized the cost of losing jobs and incomes after moving into the new 
community. The Group and the YSH worked together with the Village Committee and 
decided to support the demands of the villagers by submitting an application to 
government for a centralized facility for animal breeding, with a suitable pollution 
control mechanism.  
 
In total, the Group spent days and nights on the program without payment, while the 
village cadres were responsible for a lot of voluntary work that took up their private 
time. For example, after the construction of the new community, it required four 
security guards and four cleaners to care for it. However, the village could not afford 
the salaries at that time. Thus the village cadres took turns at cleaning the public 
community spaces. The villagers welcomed the work of the Group and the village 
cadres, and volunteered to participate themselves. They also agreed that, after 
obtaining the full price of the land credits, part of the money should be paid as an 
allowance to the Group and the village cadres. Again this agreement was achieved 
without the need for formalized collective action. Rather, because the YSH had 
organized an open and transparent process, the behaviors and attitudes of the 
individual villagers were largely consistent, meaning that the ‘subordinate society’ 
described by Zhou (1993) had become, in Lianghe Village, a powerful collective that 
supported actions that were not always in the interests of individuals, but which were 
judged to benefit the collective.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Despite participation in the CURCL policy being voluntary and despite many villagers 
gaining better housing as a result (Yep and Forrest, 2016), most commentaries have 
been largely critical of the land transfer process, with the farmers themselves 
portrayed in the main as powerless and with little social capital to defend their 
position (Long, et al, 2012; Huang, et al, 2013). This disempowerment has been 
attributed to defects in the CURCL policy which, it is argued, has provided strong 
incentives for local governments to put their own financial self-interest ahead of local 
people (Tang, et al, 2012). This may well be the case, whether the local governments 
are directly involved in the implementation of the policy, or rely on third party 
implementation via investment companies. What is not clear, however, is how far this 
is intrinsic to the CURCL policy itself (ie that it relies on power and value imbalances 
to create the financial incentives for land redistribution), or how far it is a function of 
the ways in which it has been implemented. For many commentators it is seemingly 
the former: that top-down policies of this sort necessarily subjugate individual claims 
in favor of broader welfare goals. Indeed, it seems that this view has been justified by 
claims that many farmers are better off from participating in CURCL schemes: they 
may have been separated from their land, with their livelihoods and food security 
diminished, but they live in good housing in new communities (Chen, 2009; Zhou, 
2010; Huang, et al, 2013; Jiang, et al, 2015). Even the more doubtful commentators 
such as Siciliano (2012) steer away from political arguments to concentrate on the 
social and environmental costs of relocation and separation from the land.  
 
With reference to work on collective action (van Zomeren, et al, 2012) we have not 
been convinced by these arguments – either that the CURCL policy is necessarily 
only a top-down intervention, or that economic efficiency and the maximization of 
financial surpluses are intrinsic to its implementation. Rather, we have sought to 
argue that top-down policies such as CURCL do not necessarily have to be 
implemented from the top down, while we have also argued that those who are most 
affected by such policies usually possess some agency that they can deploy through 
collective action, even if the political climate is not conducive to these tactics (see 
Liu, Z., et al, 2016). However, in contrast to conventional understandings of farmers 
under threat participating in organized and purposive collective action (Wanyama, et 
al, 2014), we have witnessed the apparent opposite: lots of individual people whose 
behaviors converged in ways that indicate a collective sensibility, if not precisely 
collective action. This is very much the approach to collective action described by 
Zhou (1993); action that is collective in character but individual in practice and intent.  
 
While suggesting that self-interest should dominate in the absence of purposive 
collection action, the evidence from Lianghe Village is that social networks and 
hierarchies can still produce collective responses, even in adverse circumstances. 
Thus, even a policy which demands that people leave their family homes for little 
compensation and an uncertain future can still be implemented effectively from the 
bottom up; and even those who stand to lose the most are capable of acting 
individually in the interests of the collective, even when their personal interests are 
likely to be compromised. It may well be that Lianghe Village is atypical; it has 
certainly not seen the levels of dissent and violence reported on occasion elsewhere 
(Huang, et al, 2013) and it has had a strong take-up of the CURCL program. One 
reason for this, and the reason that we chose it as a case study, was that the village 
operated its own program, without substantial outside intervention. While still heavily 
influenced by a small insider group, the village community does seem to have 
responded to the legitimization (efficacy) of collective action that has reportedly been 
missing from the implementation of similar schemes elsewhere (Tang, et al, 2012). 
Indeed, it seems that all three key elements for the instigation of collective action 
were present, in terms of injustice (felt keenly by many farmers), social identity (that 
Lianghe villagers are able to act in the interests of the collective) and – when the 
private company dropped out and the village committee took control of policy 
implementation – efficacy (see van Zomeren, et al, 2012).  
 
This brings us back to the aim of our paper, which was about the impacts of CURCL 
on farmers and the extent to which the outcomes of these impacts have been 
determined by the ability of the farmers to participate in effective collective action. 
The bottom line, in Lianghe Village as elsewhere, has been that many farmers have 
been displaced, often from inherited family houses to new high-rise apartments. For 
some, this has been hard, particularly when associated with having to give up their 
livestock and poultry. For those who have felt unable to continue farming there have 
also been financial worries about whether there are going to be jobs available for 
them; they may have got a new home at a fraction of the cost of building it, but they 
have also lost their livelihood as well as their way of living. There was also at least 
one farmer who kept his land, against the wider interest, because of its economic 
viability, reflecting Jiang, et al’s (2016) observation that many land policies fail to 
appreciate that different farmers face different economic environments. Yet, in 
contrast to many stories from other villages, there does not seem to have been the 
level of tension, lies and deceptions that other villages reportedly experienced. 
Indeed, the villagers made a point of highlighting the behaviors that underlie their 
social identity: that they trusted one-another and had not gone in for tactics to 
increase their personal gains at the expense of others. It was also accepted that not 
everyone would join the program, and that this was not a source of disappointment or 
dispute. 
 
One factor that may help explain the situation in Lianghe Village is that there was 
more emphasis than in other villages on the mechanics of implementing the policy. 
This allowed individuals to understand the wider implications of the policy and to act 
in ways that they knew would elide with the behaviors of others. In other words the 
actions of the YSH created the conditions in which individual behaviors converged 
into bottom-up collective action. This engagement with the detail of the CURCL policy 
may well have meant that there was little consideration of wider issues such as food 
production and security. Indeed, despite concerns for food security being part of 
many Chinese land transfer programs (Fang, et al, 2016), no one mentioned 
concerns about where their food would come from, nor what would happen to their 
land. Indeed, apart from some isolated questions about interim arrangements for 
storing tools, very little mention was made of the future of farming in the village. This 
is not to say that it was not important, but somehow most of the interviewees seem to 
have accepted that the program would be implemented and that their farms were 
worth less than the opportunity to move into a new apartment in the new village 
center.  
 
Our remaining question is to what extent the findings from Lianghe Village were 
influenced by the villagers’ experience of the implementation of the program, and the 
extent to which this was a result of decisions made by the village committee to foster 
collective action. What is clear is that the village committee took a brave decision in 
taking on program implementation after the investment company pulled out, and that 
many of the villagers respected them for this. To some extent – although probably not 
viewed in this way at the time – this heightened the sense of injustice that brought 
the community together, particularly when they discovered that the financial deals 
that they would get were not as good as those in neighboring villages. There is also 
no doubt from the interviews that the villagers had a shared identity – as fair-minded 
citizens – although whether this was as a result of the village committee’s actions, or 
was already present, is unclear. What is certain, however, is that in taking the steps 
that it did, the village committee gave efficacy to the notion that the community would 
take action and that everyone would be included in decision making and policy 
implementation. 
 
This was clearly a success. There were many stories of long meetings and difficult 
conversations, all told with a sense of pride and achievement, and all sealed with 
fingerprints at the end. There was no sense in any of the interviews that people had 
been marginalized or excluded, with even those who did not participate in the 
program claiming that it had been a fair and positive process. It certainly seems to 
have helped that the implementation group were known to the villagers and seem to 
have been held in high esteem. This meant that even where families stood to lose 
out, there was a connection to the community and collective decisions and action 
were seen to be more important than individual preferences or benefits. This should 
not detract, however, from the way that the implementation group organized and 
carried out its work. There is no doubt that its willingness to meet and discuss issues 
helped maintain the momentum of the process, while its ability to help the villagers 
secure better deals, whether over the size of their new homes, the qualification for 
scheme membership or the provision of a facility for keeping poultry, meant that the 
villagers had trust in the people and the process. 
 
In their work, Tang, et al (2012) call for the revision of the CURCL policy to include 
provision for ‘smart use’ particularly in defining what constitutes the public interest 
and how this should be protected in cases where the expropriation of land is 
required. While their concerns are primarily about limiting the spatial encroachment 
of cities on farmland, this same call echoes very much at the local scale: that steps 
need to be taken to ensure that local interests are considered and protected during 
implementation. If this cannot be via local government, because of conflicts between 
its economic and social responsibilities, our research indicates that it can be 
undertaken in a collective way that recognizes and addresses the individual concerns 
and behaviors of all those affected.  
 
That this happened in Lianghe Village is no coincidence: it was where the 
conventional top-down approach failed and was replaced by a more localized, 
democratic and, ultimately, collective approach. This is very much the contribution 
that this work has made to the current debates. It is not important in itself whether 
Lianghe Village represents an isolated or special case; what matters is that, even in 
the face of a potentially devastating top-down policy, the behaviors of local people 
coalesced in a form of individualized collective action that was legitimized by the 
actions of the village committee. While many commentators may comment on the 
lack of stakeholder engagement in the implementation of other CURCL schemes, the 
findings from Lianghe Village offer an opposing picture in which the community was 
intimately involved. This suggests that we should not rush to condemn policies such 
as CURCL for being remote or biased in favor of certain outcomes. Rather, we 
should recognize that, given suitable conditions, even marginalized people have 
agency that they can mobilize through individual behaviors that, together, amount to 
collective action. 
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